Some first reflections on a 21st century coup
Three weeks have passed since the military took matters into their own hands, forcing Evo Morales out of office and into exile in Mexico. The right-wing Añez administration, while conducting discussions about new elections, has sought to turn back the clock, reversing key policies pursued over recent years both in domestic and foreign policy. The timing of elections and a return to constitutional rule is far from certain but will not happen by 22 January, the date when those elected to executive and legislative office see their terms end. Meanwhile the Añez government has sought to use widespread and violent repression to quell opposition from social movements around the country.
New elections? Over the weekend of the 23-24 November, a deal was reached between the new government and parliament to annul the previous elections and set in motion the calling of fresh elections. Part of this involved procedures for the appointment of a new electoral tribunal. The joint constitutional committee of the two houses of the legislature has made moves in this direction. Acting President Jeanine Añez has named Salvador Romero as her representative, one of a total of seven tribunal members. He was previously head of the tribunal from 2006-2008. Immediate implications are that Añez is unlikely to hand over power to a new, elected government until the electoral process is completed, and certainly not on 22 January 2020 when the Morales government and the legislature were due to finish their term in office. Elections are unlikely before March or April.
‘Saving the nation’. The Añez government has spent time and energy on emphasising its image as ‘saviour of the nation’, attempting to change the existing narrative by criticising Evo Morales and denigrating the achievements of his government. This flies in the face of the fact that 45% of the population stood by those achievements in the 20 October elections. The government has laid emphasis on traditional republican symbols, symbols of exclusion for many. Its actions include initiating legal action against Morales for ‘terrorism’, re-establishing full diplomatic relations with the US, arresting people like Gerardo García (vice-president of the MAS), and intervening the Fondo Indígena (with a trial already under way for corruption charges). The tone is one of vindictiveness and revenge rather than dialogue, a healing of wounds and serious pacification.
There was strong criticism of the new government in a televised meeting with representatives of social movements on Saturday 23 November in the old Palacio Quemado. Segundina Flores, one of the leaders of the Bartolina Sisa campesina women’s organisation, opened her remarks accusing the government of being golpistas. She apologised for meeting with them but said that it was necessary for the well-being of the people. Shortly afterwards, televised coverage was halted.
Uncertain prospects. What happens next is not easy to predict. In the first instance, there will be tough negotiating in the joint constitutional committee regarding who the candidates to the electoral court should be. Will Añez’s time in office be extended until 6 August (formerly the date for changes of government)? Will the life of the current assembly be extended beyond 22 January? Who will be allowed to stand as candidates in new elections? There have been attempts to restrict the MAS in presenting possible candidates, not least with the arrest of Gerardo García. Hardliners Luis Fernando Camacho and Marco Pumari from the Santa Cruz and Potosí civic committees have made clear their intentions to stand for the presidency. Carlos Mesa, the runner-up in the 20 October elections, has also said he will take part. There is no indication as yet of a common platform emerging between those who opposed Morales. Meanwhile, what changes will the Añez government begin to implement in spite of its lack of legitimacy?
Some reflections:
- Role of the police and army. In spite of protestations about respect for the constitution, the army stepped in without an order from its commander-in-chief, the president. Under Añez’s government, the army has sought impunity for its actions. The government responded with a decree absolving the military of any responsibility for its actions, a move that has brought sharp international criticism on human rights grounds.
The government has blamed ‘subversive groups’ for the protests resulting from the coup, thus justifying continued police and armed forces involvement.Under Morales in the weeks prior to the coup, the approach was to try and keep the two sides, opposition and government supporters, apart (with a result of three deaths). Under Añez, the armed forces have intervened directly with more than 30 deaths (ten alone in El Alto), when in a replay of events in 2003, the army escorted a series of petrol tankers from the Senkata refinery to the city of La Paz, shooting at protesters. Eight coca producers were killed in Sacaba, Cochabamba, on 15 November.Hundreds have been wounded and over 1,000 people detained.
Military and police commanders have been changed. Outgoing armed forces commander, Williams Kaliman on his removal from office gave a fulsome speech praising the achievements of the armed forces under the Morales government. He left the country almost immediately afterwards. It is alleged he was paid US$1 million for the role he played.
- Intimidation. This was a coup almost traditional in its conception and practice, accompanied by a strong dose of intimidation but, in this case, a much-vaunted (but hardly observed) regard for the constitution. Reminiscent of coups d’état from the 1960s onwards, military planes flew low over the city of La Paz, almost grazing high-rise buildings. As noted, more than 1,000 people have been detained and at least 30 killed. Orders of arrest have been issued for Morales, the former minister of the presidency Juan Ramón Quintana, and cultures minister Wilma Alanoca. The arrest of Gerardo García was justified by the charge of ‘aggravated theft’ of a vehicle; he was apparently riding in an official vehicle at the time. Families of former government authorities have received menacing threats, and, in some instances, their homes have been torched, notably in the cities of Potosí and Oruro. This was also the case of the house of Waldo Albarracín, the rector of the San Andrés University in La Paz and a leading critic of the Morales administration. His house was attacked during the power vacuum after Morales had resigned. Interior Minister Arturo Murillo has a personal stake in the matter; his hotel in the Chapare was burnt down by Morales supporters. Women wearing polleras (traditional skirts) have been attacked in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba.
- Controlling the press. Argentine journalists were expelled by the new government and a solidarity group of Argentines temporarily detained in Santa Cruz in the last few days. Journalists critical of the Añez government have been threatened with a charge of sedition. Telesur, one of the few networks to inform on what was happening on the spot and keeping locals informed, was taken off ENTEL’s satellite TV network and then, on Saturday 23, La Paz’s COTEL TV and other departmental cable networks. Russia Today has been informed that its programming will not continue beyond 1 December. TV programmes have been largely putting over the government line, for example with claims that protests at the Senkata petrol storage deposits in El Alto threatened the safety of the whole city. This pro-government bias contrasts with the freedom of the media under Morales.
- Resistance in El Alto, the Altiplano and in Cochabamba. Resistance to the coup by social movements loyal to Morales was spontaneous. The unexpected coup made organisation difficult, and there was no clear line or leadership. Roadblocks were erected at more than 100 points nationwide. Social movements, though weakened over recent years, have turned out to defend the gains they have made under Morales, demanding Añez’s resignation and Morales’ return. Roadblocks have now been mostly lifted as discussions continue over holding elections.
- The role of the OAS. The Organization of American States has been widely criticised for preparing the ground for the coup in Bolivia. On the morning of 10 November, OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro presented a brief report of the preliminary results of the OAS audit. He said that Morales had won the elections, but not with the 10 percentage point difference needed to avoid a second round. He talked of “irregularities” (not fraud), and the preliminary report referred mainly to the work of the electoral court (where the OAS has acted at times as advisor) and not the count. There was no real evidence produced to back up his claims and no comment on points raised by the (then) opposition. The full report has still not been presented.
Instead of calling for a run-off election, the obvious next step, the OAS then called for a new round of elections and for the appointment of new electoral authorities.Not only Morales, but also the Centre for Economic and Policy Research, a Washington-based institution, have pointed to the political nature of the OAS’ intervention.Denis Racicot, formerly high commissioner of the UN Human Rights Commission in Bolivia in a letter to UN Human Rights Commissioner Michele Bachelet, talks of the “profound breakdown of constitutional order and probably a social fracture that will be difficult to repair”.He dismissed the OAS preliminary report for being superficial, lacking in objectivity and inconclusive regarding the existence of fraud.He has recommended UN involvement in new elections, as opposed to that of the OAS.
- Everyday life. Although food and fuel shortages have eased in recent days, the population of major cities like La Paz have been forced to foray for basic items of consumption and have faced large increases in prices. Those worst affected have been those with least incomes. For several weeks, food, especially meat, vegetables and fruit, was very hard to come by. Petrol shortages brought massive queues, as people waited overnight to get fuel. Distribution of cooking gas cylinders was halted, affecting not only family cooking but also bread production. Neighbourhood watch groups in some cases turned into vigilantes. Only on 27 November did the supply of meat begin to normalise.
The mood of unrest in Latin America: contagion or not?
A current of unrest pervades Latin America, with protest movements destabilising governments in Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and, most recently, Colombia. How much contagion is at work here, or are these all discrete events?
The immediate detonators of discontent are clearly not all the same: an IMF package in Ecuador, a hike in metro fares in Chile, disputed elections in Bolivia and a more generalised malaise in Colombia.
Those involved appear also to be somewhat different, depending on the context. The Bolivia coup was preceded by a largely urban, middle-class revolt, whereas in Ecuador the driving force appears to have been (with others) indigenous groups moving in on Quito from rural areas. The response to the coup in Bolivia has, of course, come from the opposite direction, from the social movements (urban and rural) seeking to protest at the overturning of the MAS government.
The outcomes may also prove rather different, though it is early days to know what these may be.
Beneath the surface, however, some general similarities can perhaps be discerned. In all three cases, and possibly also in Colombia, it is striking that none of the rulers seem to have anticipated what was going to happen. Particularly striking is the case of Ecuador, where the precedents of IMF policies being implemented are clear: the overturn of two separate governments in the early 2000s in waves of protest among indigenous and other organisations. But even in both Chile and Bolivia, those in office seem to have been unaware of the likely effects of their actions and insensitive towards the climate of public opinion. One of the skills of governing is possessing the eyes and ears to discern the danger signals.
In all four countries there appears to be a restive middle class which, increasingly, feels that government pays insufficient attention to its problems, whether providing security, employment or basic services like education, health and access to justice. While the dynamic in Ecuador came partly from rural areas, it also saw participation by workers, students and some higher-income sectors disgruntled by the rightwards turn of the Moreno government. The protests in Chile were eminently urban in nature, while the move to back Mesa in the Bolivian elections also came pre-eminently from an urban middle-class. There has been massive migration from rural to urban areas over the last 15 years, putting added strain on over-stretched services in the country’s three major cities, while years of growth have heightened people’s expectations. Perhaps Evo fell victim of his own success.
Some analysts have also pointed to economic factors, such as the slowdown caused by the ending of the commodity boom. This is perhaps most striking in Ecuador where the scope for policy is curtailed by having a dollarized economy. The Chilean economy too has been depressed by the fall in the prices of copper supplied (mainly) to China, while some similar effects are notable in Colombia whose economy remains largely dependent on the export of minerals and oil. Bolivia is slightly different here. It has successfully weathered the downturn in natural gas prices by using government investment spending to maintain domestic demand. But it too has seen growth rates decline somewhat over the past three years while still leading the South American growth league.
These similarities do not explain why these instances of protest took place at much the same time. There seems little reason for contagion as such. People in one Latin American country do not tend to follow closely events in others, and media coverage tends to be focused on local events rather than what is going on elsewhere. The Bolivian protests were not fuelled in any meaningful way by what took place on the streets of Santiago or Quito. And the protests in all four countries appear to have found little echo on the streets of Lima or other Peruvian cities where President Vizcarra benefits from seeking to fight engrained corruption. It would seem more to be a question of the middle-classes, whether more established or recent arrivals, bearing the brunt of low growth economies, with expectations increasingly unmet.
But what may be more of a common denominator could be the powerful reminder to economic and political elites of the force of public opinion and their own limited capacity to deal with protest once it is unleashed.
