On 17 August, Bolivia went to the polls to elect the next president (and national deputies and senators), with four contenders from the right.  Surprisingly, in spite of all the predictions and polls, the PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) candidates Rodrigo Paz/Edmand Lara won, with 25.15% of the total vote (and 32.17% of valid votes).  In the run-off election on 19 October between the PDC and Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga’s Libre alliance, the Paz/Lara ticket won with a 10-percentage point advantage (54.9%).  Paz won in six departments, with Quiroga winning in three (Santa Cruz, Tarija and Beni).

 

Voters favoured Paz/Lara for several reasons:

 

 

As a result of the first round of elections, the composition of the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP) is as follows:

 

 

The result shows clearly the division of the two houses amongst the three contenders, the PDC, the Libre Alliance and the Unidad Alliance.  At first sight it seemed as if these three organisations would have overwhelming control over the two houses.

 

 

Paz was sworn in as president on 8 November, in the presence of four South American presidents: Javier Milei from Argentina, Gabriel Boric from Chile, Santiago Peña from Paraguay, and Daniel Noboa from Ecuador.  Also present was Christopher Landau, US Undersecretary of State.

 

The first part of the cabinet was sworn in the following day.  The number of ministries was reduced from 17 to 15 (and subsequently to 14).  These are: Foreign Affairs; Ministry of the Presidency; Interior; Defence; Development Planning and Environment; Economy and Public Finance; Hydrocarbons and Energies; Productive and Rural Development and Water; Public Works, Services and Housing; Mining and Metallurgy; Justice and Institutional Transparency; Labour, Employment and Social Welfare; Health and Sport; Education; and Sustainable Tourism, Cultures, Folklore and Gastronomy.

 

The main changes have been the suppression of the Ministry of the Environment and Water, with the inclusion of environmental matters within the Ministry of Development Planning, and water in the Ministry of Productive and Rural Development.  A particularly important change is that of land distribution (INRA), formerly part of the Ministry of Rural Development, which has passed to the Ministry of the Presidency.  The Ministry of Cultures has been replaced by the Ministry of Sustainable Tourism, Cultures, Folklore and Gastronomy.  Some ten days later, it was decided to further reduce the cabinet by closing the Ministry of Justice, with some attributions passed to the Ministry of the Presidency and others to Productive and Rural Development.

 

The Ministry of the Presidency has been strengthened by increasing the number of vice-ministries from four to seven.  Communications has been demoted to director level, whilst vice-ministries now cover the following areas: interinstitutional coordination (coordination with government bodies), parliamentary coordination (a new area, normally responsibility of the vice-president), coordination with social movements, autonomies, land distribution/INRA, transparency, equal opportunities (the last two previously part of the Ministry of Justice).

 

 

Rodrigo Paz had been mayor of Tarija, a national deputy and was a senator for Tarija in the last government. His father, Jaime Paz, was vice-president in the government of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1984) and president (1989-1993).  His great uncle was former three times president Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-56, 1960-64 and 1985-89). 

 

Edmand Lara, the vice-president, had been a former captain in the police, who was thrown out for accusing several superiors of extortion and corruption; his anti-corruption stance and online presence via TikTok propelled him into the political limelight.

 

As an organisation, the PDC and its presidential and vice-presidential candidates were little prepared for their win at the polls, unable to count on a party structure which could come up with a team to lead the government.  Several of those appointed to top jobs have worked in the past with other governments:

 

 

Several ministers formed part of the de facto government of Jeannine Añez (2019-20), notably Gabriel Espinoza, now minister of the economy and William Santamaría, vice-minister in charge of parliamentary coordination at the Ministry of the Presidency, who was vice-minister to Arturo Murillo in the interior ministry.

 

Two influences on the government are of particular importance, on the one hand that of the Unidad Alliance -led by millionaire businessman Samuel Doria Medina- which came third in the elections, and gave its support to Paz as the winner in the first round and, on the other, business interests, particularly agribusiness from Santa Cruz.

 

Two members of the Unidad alliance, Lupo and Espinoza form an important part of the new team, Lupo as minister of the presidency and Espinoza as minister of the economy.

 

Representatives of private enterprise include:

 

 

 

The economic agenda.  In his acceptance speech Paz announced that the problem of fuel shortage was a thing of the past, and that over the following days supplies of petrol and diesel would be freely available.  This had been one of the previous agreements reached in the United States, with letters of credit issued to guarantee the provision of the necessary fuel.  While availability of fuel has improved in the main cities, it is still erratic, and more distant areas continue to face shortages.

 

The new authorities have stressed the negative state of the economy as received from the Arce government.  While in financial circles allegations are made about US$ 15 billion that cannot be accounted for, Espinoza has mentioned US$9 billion.  Paz himself has changed his discourse from referring to a ‘blocking state’ (Estado tranca), to calling it a ‘sewer state’ (Estado cloaca).  Though cases of corruption may be exposed, the purpose here seems to be to discredit the whole 20-year period of MAS government.  Those institutions in the firing line are mainly emblematic or strategic bodies such as Emapa (the food distribution agency, whose director was already being questioned before the change of government); BOA, the state aviation company; the INRA; the La Paz Teleférico (cable car transport system); and YPFB (the state hydrocarbons company), for which a ‘truth commission’ has now been set up to find the ‘truth’ about corruption and other issues.

 

Some minor economic measures were introduced in the second week of the new government, ostensibly preparing the scene for further measures.  These included rescinding some taxes, notably on millionaires and control on dollar accounts (ITF) and a proposal to reduce 2026 budget expenditure by 30%.  The former were aimed at opening the country to foreign investment, and the latter to reducing public investment and cutting back the state apparatus.  Meanwhile, there is no marked change in the scarcity of dollars, nor are exporters being asked to repatriate their earnings in dollars.  Any influx of dollars is for now dependent on the arrival of credit (so far only a fraction of the US$3.1 billion CAF contribution is due to be disbursed).  Private individuals, whose dollars have been frozen in their accounts for more than two years, are being told to wait for another six to nine months before they can have access to their money, this because the central bank coffers need to be replenished first.  With the parallel exchange market continuing, all imported goods, on which the country depends, are expensive.

 

The demands of the private sector were made clear during the electoral period.  The day before the new government took office, the industry and commerce organisation CAINCO arranged a forum, Visión Bolivia 2025, supported by multilateral bodies and attended by visitors, including a European Union delegation.  Agribusiness interests, particularly from Santa Cruz, presented the government with the decrees they want passed at a lobbying event in late November.  Key demands include legal security for foreign investment and local operations, the removal of limits to exports, and the introduction of GM technology.  With business interests strongly represented in the cabinet, these are well placed to ensure their needs are met.  It is worth mentioning that business interests in Santa Cruz had supported Tuto Quiroga in the run-off election.

 

Judicial changes. A decision rapidly taken during the first two weeks of government was to finally dismiss those judges who had stayed on beyond their remit in the Constitutional Tribunal (known as autoprorrogados), a popular move.  And moves are also under way in the Legislative Assembly to carry out the elections necessary for new judges to be chosen to fill the vacant posts.

 

Foreign affairs, relations with the US.  Paz had travelled to the United States prior to his swearing in, mainly to talk to financial institutions and members of the Trump administration.  Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, emphasised the commitment of Washington to the new government in Bolivia.  Likewise, the IMF expressed willingness to help.  The CAF (Corporación Andina de Fomento – Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean) committed to making available US$3.1 billion, a small part of which is already being paid out. 

 

During Landau’s stay in La Paz for the swearing in, both countries’ representatives announced the restoring of diplomatic relations at full ambassadorial level.  Landau said it was extraordinary (insólito) that there had been no formal relations between the two countries in the last 20 years, adding that “21^st century socialism is dead in Bolivia”.  He referred to the possible return of the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) to Bolivia and questioned Bolivia’s relations with Iran, and Cuba and Venezuela.  He brought with him a present worth US$700,000 of equipment and medicines to treat people with AIDS.  Part of the deal would also seem to be the reestablishment of relations with Israel, a policy which is now going ahead.  Another is the decision to allow operation of Starlink (Elon Musk’s communications company) to operate in Bolivia.

 

Changing the symbols.  Even before the new president was sworn in, in the house of Deputies the Bible and cross were reinstated, even though the constitution defines the plurinational state as secular.  The multicoloured wiphala flag, one of the country’s three official flags, representing indigenous peoples, was removed from outside the presidential palace.  Public bodies have replaced the chakana, the Andean cross, on their letterheads, with the national shield.  Tourism is also currently seeking a new country brand.

 

Popular concerns 

 

Whilst access to fuel may be improving with fewer queues at petrol stations, the lack of action on economic matters is creating problems of uncertainty and concern.  The day after the inauguration, in La Paz production of the marraqueta, the bread roll most people eat, stopped.  Bakers had not been paid the state subsidy for flour and other inputs.  With no swift action by the government, they raised the price to 0.80 bs. a roll, from 0.50 bs., so people had to pay the same for five rolls as for eight previously.  The government cut the subsidy and the bakers called a 72-hour strike, making bread very scarce.  There have also been reports in El Alto of rising prices for previously subsidised basic services like water and electricity.

 

 

Tensions have emerged in the ALP between government supporters and those from Libre.  The PDC and Unidad alliance worked to get a law approved quickly on elections for sub-national posts (mayors and governors), but this met with strong questioning from the Libre alliance (second in number of seats to the PDC).  Though the problems were eventually resolved, they raise questions about the ease with which more contentious issues will be dealt with.

 

Tensions have also arisen in the relationship between Paz and Lara.  Since taking office, Paz has been surrounded by business groups, each pushing for influence, notably those from the Unidad Alliance camp.  Lara has been largely excluded from the daily running of government and left to carry out his function as leader of the legislature.  He was expressly told he did not need to attend cabinet meetings.  Further, with a new post set up in the Ministry of the Presidency to facilitate coordination with the Legislative Assembly, this has impinged on the vice-president’s responsibilities. 

 

The schism between the two relates to the more general point that Paz (and his supporters) appear to be reneging on election commitments.  For example, during the campaign Paz ruled out the need to depend on large-scale credit from abroad, in particular any deal with the IMF.  It now seems that this is no longer the case, and it raises the question of how and when Paz changed course, probably during his trip to the United States.  The cabinet appointments point towards ‘state capture’ by business elites.  During the campaign, Lara represented a very different profile and he is widely attributed to have effectively won over public opinion in areas of the country in which the MAS previously held sway.  Given Lara’s popularity, the situation of confrontation adds to a sense of instability going forward.

 

 

So, whilst the government is seeking to create a sense of stability, in fact, the lack of action regarding economic problems is leading to malaise.  Inflation and the increased costs of meeting daily needs have not been tackled, and removal of subsidies such as in the case of bread, are not being well handled.

 

 

 

 

The household census covers a large range of economic and social metrics, and provides detailed information down to the level of individual municipalities.  Although the validity of the 2024 census was questioned at the time, mainly by far-right groups in Santa Cruz, it has since been praised for the way it was conducted.

 

Key findings include:

 

Population and its distribution.  The census put the country’s population at 11,365,333.  While the gender balance was almost equal between men and women, the percentage of children shows a clear drop.  38.7% of the population were children in 2001, whereas by 2024, this had fallen to 27%.  The birth rate has fallen, and life expectancy has increased.  Geographically, the 2024 census showed that the population of Santa Cruz department had overtaken that of La Paz since 2012.  As a consequence, Santa Cruz gained an extra seat in the legislature since the distribution of seats reflects population trends.

 

 A decline in poverty rates.  The census showed that in 2024, 29.8% of the population suffered from one or more unmet needs.  This compares with 33.9% in the 2012 census.  The ‘unmet needs’ measurement captures a range of indicators of deprivation, not just monetary poverty.  Only 4.5% of the population live in poor quality housing, compared to 14.1% in 2001.  Access to electricity has risen from 66.1% of households to 92.2%.

 

Urbanisation.  In 2024, 72% of the population were classified as living in urban environments, up from 62% in 2001. Bolivia has seen significant urban migration in the last 25 years, even though many people maintain also maintain roots in rural areas.  During the 2024 census, many people were reported to have returned to their rural communities to boost population rates, since this was seen as a way of ensuring more government resources were channelled to their places of origin.  The 2024 figure may therefore somewhat understate the degree of urbanisation.

 

Improved educational standards.  Literacy rates have increased from 86.7% in 2001 to 95.9% in 2024.  School attendance increased from 74.7% to 94.3% over the same period.  These increases are likely to have benefitted mainly girls.  The Juancito Pinto programme, a conditional cash transfer to families whose children are in full-time education, was probably an important factor in increasing school attendance.  The quality of education in schools, especially in rural areas, remains poor.  A larger proportion of females are now in higher education than males.

 

A decrease in indigeneity.  The census asks people to self-identify along ethnic grounds.  While in 2001, 62% declared themselves to be indigenous, this fell to 43% in 2012 and to 38% in 2024.  Self-identification is, of course, a subjective metric and one that depends on the availability of alternative classifications on the census form.  However, other forms of ethnic identification, such as maternal language, the language habitually used, and the ability to speak an indigenous language, have all decreased significantly between the 2012 and 2024 censuses.

 

Internet access.  This increased to 76.3% of households in 2024, compared to just 9.6% in 2012.