By Tuesday 30 June, exactly 16 weeks after the first two cases of Coronavirus were detected in Bolivia (10 March), the situation has deteriorated rapidly, as the following graph shows:

 

 

Positive cases began to take off from the end of May onwards.  The government had acted swiftly, imposing a lockdown from 16 March, and then a ‘rigid’ lockdown from 21 March.  However, under pressure from the many needing to go out to earn money to survive, the government declared a more ‘flexible’ quarantine from 1 June, with a partial return to work and more freedom of movement.

 

On 30 June there were 33,219 people declared positive and 1,123 people had died from the disease.  Breaking this down by department gives a better idea of the situation:

 

 

The table shows how Santa Cruz, Beni, Cochabamba and La Paz account for 89% of all cases, and Santa Cruz and the Beni alone for 69%.

 

Numbers on their own, however, do not help to relate the effect of the virus to population numbers of in each department.  The following chart provides information on the number of deaths per every 100,000 people:

 

 

Though the curve is still very much on the increase, these figures highlight the critical situation in the Beni in particular, with the number of deaths/100,000 above the figures in the US, Peru, Brazil and other countries in South America, though still lower than the UK, Spain, Italy and France.  Figures for Bolivia as a whole show less deaths per 100,000 than in Peru, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, but are higher than in Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela.

 

Though data collection in different departments has been erratic, with weeks of silence from Oruro, Beni and Pando for example, this may partly be explained by the difficulties in carrying out tests; looking at the departmental numbers from week to week show a series of mountains and troughs rather than a curve as such.

 

As Bolivia’s winter begins, there are no signs of the virus abating.  Actual numbers of people affected are probably much higher than the official figures given because of, for example, the reduced numbers of tests carried out and people dying in their homes (and on the street) without ever accessing the health system.

 

As we pointed out in the last Special Bulletin on Coronavirus in Bolivia, the government declared quarantine shortly after the first cases were identified.  Under pressure from people needing to bring food home to their families, the government alleviated the stricter measures on 1 June, whilst maintaining certain limitations such as school and university attendance, prohibition of large gatherings, and international flights.  Responsibility for the lockdown has been passed to departmental and municipal local government, which respond in line with local conditions.   Certain areas of high risk have subsequently been put back under strict lockdown, or ‘encapsulated’, with the military controlling access and enforcing the quarantine.

 

Part of the stated purpose of the lockdown was to allow more time to gear up the public health response.  This appears to have been a total failure.  Improvisation and political interests have prevailed instead of serious planning and management at the national level.  The response of the state to the pandemic has been deficient in a number of ways:

 

A report at the end of May from the Association of Doctors in Intensive Care showed there were only 91 intensive care beds nationwide.  The 37 beds in Santa Cruz were all occupied, as were the seven beds in the Beni; there were no intensive care beds in Pando.  In Cochabamba (where there were ten beds), La Paz (ten), Tarija (ten), Oruro (eight), Chuquisaca (six) and Potosí (three), there were still some beds free for those that needed them.  By the first week of June, in La Paz, with its ten beds for more than 2 million people, all available beds were fully occupied too.  By 10 June, the government had not delivered on the 500 intensive care beds it had promised; it had provided only 26 new beds in Cochabamba and the Beni.

 

Since then, there have been some improvements. There were 30 new intensive care beds in Santa Cruz as of the end of June, and a third hospital in La Paz had been set aside just for Covid-19 cases. But it is difficult to get a clear picture of the situation at any particular moment given lack of coherent information being made available.Obviously, the advance of the virus has led to ever greater pressure on hospitals, as well as morgues, cemeteries and crematoriums, especially in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba.

 

Health systems in several hospitals are on the point of being overwhelmed due to the infection of hospital staff.In recent weeks, five of the eight hospitals in the Miraflores area of La Paz have closed their doors to all but emergencies, given the numbers of staff infected with the virus. In Cochabamba, the Hospital Viedma and Salomón Klein have both been shut temporarily for the same reason.In Santa Cruz, several hospitals are on the verge of collapse.Also, new hospitals ready to start operations have been held back, as was the case of that in Montero, in Santa Cruz department, where repainting the hospital green instead of the original blue delayed its opening for several weeks.Even the governor of Santa Cruz, Rubén Costas, from the same Demócratas party as the government (whose colour is green), complained about this.

 

The situation in the Beni has been particularly serious. It suffers from a chronic lack of proper health structures, a large number of medical staff falling sick, the existing medical system being unable to respond to the demand, and people dying in their homes. 

The house-to-house search in Santa Cruz in late June reached some 468,491 people, 83,590 families, and detected 66,000 people suspected of having the virus, far more than the official figure.The Institute of Forensic Research (IDIF) in Santa Cruz reported some 50 deaths in people’s homes each day.In Trinidad (Beni) the Covid-19 graveyard has double the number of graves as the official number of deaths.

 

In spite of the system of autonomies established for different levels of administration, the Añez government has tended to take the lead during the pandemic and to centralise decisions.   While departmental health bodies (SEDES) are answerable to departmental government, central government has intervened in at least five of these bodies.  In the case of La Paz, there has been an ongoing battle for control of the SEDES between the Ministry of Health and the departmental governor, Félix Patzi.  Coordination with subnational governments (both departmental and municipal) has generally been poor, making the fight against the virus less efficient.  Part of the problem has to do with who controls the resources (especially where new jobs are concerned).

 

From the beginning of June, the government handed over responsibility for deciding on the nature of lockdown and measures to be taken to departmental and municipal governments, depending on the levels of risk perceived in each place.  However, this was not accompanied by the necessary funding.  The Association of Municipalities in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba organised roadblocks and hunger strikes in protest.  The Comité Pro-Santa Cruz criticised Añez for the decision to hand over responsibility to decentralised governments, essentially washing her hands of overall responsibility for the problem.

 

All this has taken place at a time when Treasury transfers of funds to municipalities are declining, falling by no less than 67% in the first four months of 2020, and when their income from gas sales is also declining (by as much as 53% in the last year).  To alleviate this situation, the Legislative Assembly (PLA), in which the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) has a majority of seats, took the initiative to pass a law returning the money from an oil and gas exploration fund into which municipalities and departmental governments had contributed over several years, worth 12% of the amount they receive yearly from gas sales.  This law was signed by Añez on 29 June.

 

 

After the coup of October/November, a second round of general elections was set for 3 May.   With the elections postponed because of the pandemic, the change of date needed approval by the Legislative Assembly.  As the date in May loomed, the Assembly drew up a law requiring elections to be held within three months (i.e. before 3 August).  When Añez refused to sign the bill, the president of the Senate, Eva Copa, went ahead with its approval.

 

As the pandemic developed, it became apparent that this date was too soon, and discussions were held amongst the candidates and the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) to set a new date, 6 September.  The Assembly approved the law, but again Añez refused to sign.  She argued that surely one or two months more would not make a difference and that the health crisis made it inappropriate to hold elections so soon.  Protests came from several of the candidates, accusing her of wanting to delay the elections and stay in office for longer.  The Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and the Miners Federation (FSTMB) said that she would either leave government through the elections or as a result of the political upheaval that would ensue if she did not.  Finally, following a meeting with the president of the TSE – whom she had appointed – Añez went ahead and signed the bill into law.

 

Its lack of legitimacy has made the Añez government’s management of the pandemic more difficult.  In the second of its so-called Delphi questionnaires, the Friedrich Ebert institute (FES) asked 140 leading figures in June about a series of current issues.  A large majority (79%) considered that elections were fundamental to overcoming the crisis of political representation the country is facing.  No less than 69% saw Anez’s government as not being committed to elections, whilst 71% saw it as using the health emergency to stifle dissent.  As many as 84% considered that [mis]-management of the health emergency could lead to the unleashing of a new political crisis.

 

As the different candidates begin to raise their profile, the government is using every possible pretext to discredit the MAS, Evo Morales, and the MAS’s chosen candidate, former finance minister Luis Arce.  Not only is it criticising the MAS for its role in government over nearly 14 years, but also attempting to link it to cases of corruption and alleged ‘subversion’.  The MAS has been accused of blocking roads in Cochabamba (at Kara Kara) and Yapacaní in Santa Cruz and destroying several communications antennas in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.  The ‘encapsulation’ of the Chapare was staged seemingly in vengeance against the coca producers, most of whom support the MAS.  Gabriela Montaño, the former MAS health minister, currently in exile in Argentina, has been accused of involvement in the ventilators corruption case.  Defence Minister Fernando López has accused the MAS of creating a “campaign of chaos, attempting to destabilise the government”.  Interior Minister Arturo Murillo said house-to-house searches were being carried out to detect conspiring masistas.  Meanwhile, judicial processes continue as a means of political persecution and intimidation, with the Delphi 2 survey showing that 79% of those interviewed considered the government to be carrying out political persecution.  Similarly, journalists stepping out of line, such as Junior Arias from the Santa Cruz TV channel Gigavisión, face huge pressure to toe the official line.  Arias was involved in exposing a case of corruption in the acquisition of teargas at inflated prices.

 

 

Increasingly, the economic situation is becoming the focus of widespread concern.  With four months virtual shutdown of the productive apparatus, the situation looks grim.  Both the government and the World Bank are talking in terms of a 5.9% contraction in GDP this year.  With the reduction in economic activity and the fall in the volumes (and price) of gas sales, several sectors are facing critical situations.  The loss of jobs is already a problem, with urban unemployment rising from 5.7% to 7.3% between March and April (INE).  There have been large demonstrations in La Paz by factory workers, drivers of public transport vehicles, and rural teachers.  The fall in revenue in the oil and gas sector will have a negative knock-on effect on the funding of subnational governments and universities.  Remittances from Bolivians living abroad also are set to decline significantly this year.

 

Despite one-off payments of Bs. 500 (approx. US$70) to more vulnerable sectors and reductions in the amount people pay for basic services, households have faced increasing hardship due to the four-month shutdown.  Payment on loans was postponed until September and firms were helped with paying their obligations to staff and through the delaying of tax payments.  The government’s own fiscal position has become increasingly perilous.

 

In a recent interview, the president of the private sector organisation, the CEPB, which welcomed the November coup, recommended [largescale] borrowing, a reduction in taxes, the liberalisation of labour laws, more incentives for exports and a further deregulation of the economy.  During the pandemic, the private sector has benefitted from support from the government to the tune of Bs. 900 million (US$ 129 million).

 

On 24 June, the government approved its national ‘job reactivation’ programme, in an attempt to help save 3 million jobs.  Though the details are still unclear, initially the investment will be of $US 2.3 billion, to be channelled through four funds.  These will administer credits to be channelled through the banks to private sector firms.  The emphasis, it would seem, is on bailing out the larger companies.

 

 

As pointed to in our previous bulletin on the virus, the government has been carrying out a series of measures that go well beyond the responsibilities of an ‘interim’ government.  More evidence of this has emerged since:

 

 

Adrián Villanueva, virtuoso of the quena and magical crafter of musical instruments (charangos, panpipes and Andean flutes) died in London in June whilst visiting family and friends in the UK.  Many will have heard his haunting playing on visits he made with Rumillacta, whose music drew large crowds wherever they went.  Straight-forward, open, always curious, Adrián made a strong impression on all those who met him.  The sound of his quena will ring out unexpectedly down many a street, at any time.  Jallalla, Adrián!